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I. Introduction
Article I, Section Six, Clause One of the American
Constitution provides that Senators and Representatives:
shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the
Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at
the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in
either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.1

This language, known as the Speech or Debate Clause (the
Clause), sets forth the legislative privilege.2 Like the President’s
executive privilege, the legislative privilege permits legislators to
refuse to disclose information protected by the Clause. Since the
Clause’s inception, the Supreme Court has interpreted it broadly
and has continually expanded the breadth of the privilege given
to legislators.3 Such interpretations have enabled self-interested
legislators to abuse the privilege by shielding their misconduct
from the Judiciary, the Executive, and the public.4 Moreover, this
improper broadening of the legislative privilege has precluded
needed inquiry into legislators’ actions.5
The Supreme Court has not indicated whether the privilege
granted by the Speech or Debate Clause permits legislators to
refuse to disclose documents relating to legislative actions.6 The
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
2. Id.
3. See infra Part II (discussing the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause
as set forth by the Supreme Court).
4. See infra Part IV (discussing legislators’ ability to hide misconduct
because of the broadening of the Speech or Debate Clause).
5. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the need for legislative accountability).
6. See infra Part III (indicating that the Supreme Court has not
determined whether the Speech or Debate Clause includes a document
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Ninth and D.C. Circuits, however, have considered this question.7
The D.C. Circuit broadly interpreted the Clause and determined
that it privileges legislators’ documents.8 In contrast, the Ninth
Circuit decided that when the legislative action at issue is not
protected by the privilege, the Clause does not prohibit the review
of relevant documents referencing legislative acts.9
In Part II, this Note explains the current interpretation of
the Speech or Debate Clause as set forth by Supreme Court
decisions. Part III discusses the D.C. and Ninth Circuit cases
creating the circuit split regarding the privilege’s application to
document disclosure. Part IV analyzes the Speech or Debate
Clause using textual, historical, and ethical constitutional
interpretive methods. Finally, Part V proposes a new test for
applying the Speech or Debate Clause that will answer the
question of document disclosure and narrow the scope of the
privilege.
II. Supreme Court Decisions: Defining the Scope of the Speech
or Debate Clause
To narrow the scope of the legislative privilege and thereby
attempt to curb its abuse, it is important to understand the
current interpretation of the Clause as set forth by the Supreme
Court. In its numerous decisions addressing the scope of the
Speech or Debate Clause,10 the Court has provided legislators
with a very powerful protection.11 For instance, it has indicated
nondisclosure privilege).
7. See infra Part III (discussing the circuit split between the D.C. and
Ninth Circuits regarding the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause).
8. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 663
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Accordingly, we hold that a search that allows agents of the
Executive to review privileged materials without the Member’s consent violates
the Clause.”).
9. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating
that “the alleged choices and actions for which [Renzi was] prosecuted [lay]
beyond [the] limits” of the Speech or Debate Clause and declining to find a
document “non-disclosure privilege”).
10. See infra Part II.A−B (discussing Supreme Court decisions defining the
Speech or Debate Clause’s scope).
11. See, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501−03
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that, when the privilege applies, it applies absolutely.12 The Court
has also stated that the Clause must be “read broadly to
effectuate its purposes.”13
In addition to giving legislators a robust privilege,
throughout its decisions, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
two distinct portions of the Speech or Debate Clause: (1) “Speech
or Debate in either House” and (2) “shall not be questioned in any
other Place.”14
A. Defining “Speech or Debate”
In Kilbourn v. Thompson,15 the first Supreme Court case
considering the Speech or Debate Clause, the Court rejected the
narrowest interpretation of the phrase “speech or debate.”16
Rather than limiting the Clause to its literal meaning, the Court
concluded that “speech or debate” also includes “things generally
done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to
the business before it.”17 For example, the Court explained that
written reports, resolutions, and voting all constitute privileged
“speech or debate.”18
(1975) (discussing the powerful privilege granted by the Speech or Debate
Clause); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966) (same).
12. See, e.g., Eastland, 421 U.S. at 501 (indicating that “the prohibitions of
the Speech or Debate Clause are absolute” (citations omitted)).
13. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 180.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
15. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204−05 (1880) (holding that a
resolution by defendant members of the House of Representatives was
privileged by the Speech or Debate Clause).
16. See id. at 204 (explaining that a narrow construction of the Clause,
which would “limit [the privilege] to words spoken in debate,” would not be
adopted).
17. See id.; see also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617−18 (1972)
(quoting with approval the expansive interpretation of the Speech or Debate
Clause set forth in Kilbourn); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179
(1966) (same).
18. See Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204 (“The reason of the [Clause] is as forcible
in its application to written reports presented in that body by its committees, to
resolutions offered, which, though in writing, must be reproduced in speech, and
to the act of voting, whether it is done vocally or by passing between the
tellers.”).
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In Tenney v. Brandhove,19 the Court followed the expansive
interpretation of the phrase “speech or debate” set forth in
Kilbourn.20 The Tenney Court determined that an investigation
by a legislative committee was within “the sphere of legitimate
legislative activity” covered by the privilege.21 The Court
explained that a broad interpretation of the Clause is necessary
to enable legislators to fulfill their roles as lawmakers.22 In
reaching its conclusion the Court asserted that to “exceed[] the
bounds of legislative power it must be obvious that there was a
usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the
19. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378−79 (1951) (holding that a
committee investigation was protected by the legislative privilege because it did
not clearly impinge upon the powers of another branch of the federal
government). The Court considered whether defendant legislators could be
subject to civil liability for requiring plaintiff Brandhove to appear at a
committee hearing. Id. at 370−72. A committee of California legislators, “the
Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Unamerican Activities,” summoned
Brandhove to appear before it at a committee hearing. Id. at 369−70. Brandhove
appeared, but refused to testify. Id. at 370. Consequently, the state courts held
him in contempt. Id. at 371. Brandhove then brought a claim seeking damages
in which he asserted that the committee hearing “‘was not held for a legislative
purpose.’” Id. He argued that the hearing was instead held to prevent him from
“‘effectively exercising his constitutional rights.’” Id. The Court first explained
that “acts done within the sphere of legislative activity” could not subject
legislators to civil liability. Id. at 376. The Court then considered whether the
committee action constituted a privileged legislative act. Id. The Court stated
that in order for legislators to fulfill their role as lawmakers, “the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial” must be avoided. Id. at 377. The Court
concluded that a broad privilege is necessary to accomplish this goal. Id.
Additionally, the Court explained that the voting process rather than the courts
should be used to correct legislative abuse. Id. at 378. Finally, the Court stated
that for legislative action to be outside the privilege, it must clearly encroach
upon the power of the Executive or the Judiciary. Id. The Court found that the
committee hearing did not reach this high standard, and the action was
protected from civil suit by the legislative privilege. Id. at 378−79.
20. See id. at 378 (stating that “[t]o find that a [legislative action] has
exceeded the bounds of legislative power it must be obvious that there was a
usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive”);
see also Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204 (stating that the legislative privilege extends
to “things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in
relation to the business before it”).
21. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376−79.
22. See id. at 377 (“Legislators are immune from deterrents to the
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence
but for the public good.”).
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Executive.”23 Moreover, the case made clear that a mere
allegation of a legislator’s improper motive does not terminate
the privilege.24
In spite of the expansive definition of “speech or debate,”
the Court has indicated that there is a limit to which actions
by legislators will qualify as privileged legislative acts.25 For
example, in Gravel v. United States,26 although the Court
agreed with prior cases stating that the privilege’s scope is not
limited to literal speech and debate, it emphasized that
“[l]egislative acts are not all-encompassing.”27 Gravel provided
23. Id. at 378.
24. See id. at 377 (“The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the
privilege.”).
25. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972) (“Legislative
acts are not all-encompassing.”); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951)
(“This Court has not hesitated to sustain the rights of private individuals when
it found Congress was acting outside its legislative role.” (citations omitted)).
26. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618, 624−25 (1972) (holding
that although the legislative privilege “applies not only to a Member but also to
his aides,” the privilege does not extend to actions that do not fall within the
legitimate legislative sphere). The Court considered whether a subpoena
requiring Senator Gravel’s aide, Rodberg, to testify in an investigation into
possible criminal conduct relating to the disclosure and publication of top-secret
national defense information, known as the Pentagon Papers, violated the
legislative privilege. Id. at 608−09. Senator Gravel, as chairman, called an
evening meeting of the Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds of the Senate
Public Works Committee. Id. at 609. At the meeting, he read large portions of
the Pentagon Papers to the subcommittee and had the entire forty-seven
volumes of the papers placed into the public record. Id. Rodberg helped Senator
Gravel prepare for and hold the subcommittee meeting. Id. A few weeks later,
Senator Gravel had the papers published by Beacon Press. Id. at 609−10. First,
the Court explained that for legislators to be adequately protected from the
Executive and Judiciary, the legislative privilege must shield legislators’ aides
from questioning. Id. at 616−18. The Court then determined the extent to which
the Clause protected Senator Gravel from inquiry regarding the crime. Id. at
622. The Court discussed the history of the Clause and noted that “the English
legislative privilege was not viewed as protecting republication of an otherwise
immune libel on the floor of the House.” Id. Similarly, the Court concluded that
although the Senator could not be questioned about the subcommittee meeting
itself, his involvement in the publication of the papers was not a privileged
legislative act. Id. at 616, 626. Thus, the Court held that the Speech or Debate
Clause did not protect Rodberg from testifying in the criminal investigation
about his own involvement and that of Senator Gravel in arranging the
publication of the Pentagon Papers. Id. at 626−27.
27. See id. at 624−25.
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a test for determining which actions beyond literal speech and
debate can be classified as immune legislative acts.28 To be
privileged under the Gravel standard, a legislator’s action must
be “an integral part of the deliberative and communicative
processes by which Members participate in committee and
House proceedings with respect to the consideration and
passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to
other matters which the Constitution places within the
jurisdiction of either House.”29 This standard vastly decreases
the number of activities that will be deemed immune
legislative acts under the Clause.30
Additionally, Gravel emphasized that a senator who
violates criminal law, in his role as a legislator, cannot avoid
liability by simply asserting the legislative privilege.31 In the
case of Senator Gravel, this meant he could be asked about his
involvement with the publication of confidential national
defense papers because this was a nonprivileged violation of
criminal law.32 He could not, however, be forced to answer
questions regarding the subcommittee meeting at which he had
portions of the confidential papers read into the public record.33
The Court ultimately held that the Speech or Debate Clause
could not legitimize Senator Gravel’s aide’s refusal to testify
before a grand jury about his or the Senator’s criminal action.34
28. See id. at 625 (giving a standard for determining which acts are
privileged by the Speech or Debate Clause).
29. Id.
30. See Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative Privilege
and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1118 (1973) (stating that
in Gravel, “a split Court held that the scope of activities protected by the clause
is very narrow and does not include publication of the record or receipt of the
material for use in committee”).
31. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 626 (1972) (stating that the
Speech or Debate Clause “does not privilege either Senator or aide to violate an
otherwise valid criminal law in preparing for or implementing legislative acts”).
32. See id. at 626 (“If republication of these classified papers would be a
crime under an Act of Congress, it would not be entitled to immunity under the
Speech or Debate Clause.”).
33. See id. at 616 (“We have no doubt that Senator Gravel may not be made
to answer—either in terms of questions or in terms of defending himself from
prosecution—for the events that occurred at the subcommittee meeting.”).
34. See id. at 626−27 (“The Speech or Debate Clause does not in our view
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On the same day that Gravel was decided,35 the Court, in
Brewster v. United States,36 applied a similar standard for
interpreting legislative acts under the Clause.37 The Court
explicitly stated that the Kilbourn standard should not be
expanded to include in the privilege “everything . . . ‘related’ to
the office of a Member.”38 If such a standard were implemented,
legislators could characterize nearly every action as somehow
related to the legislative process.39 To avoid this impermissible
broadening, the Court restricted the privilege to questioning
about legislators’ actions and motivations that are “clearly a part
of the legislative process.”40 Like in Gravel, when applying this
extend immunity to Rodberg, as a Senator’s aide, from testifying before the
grand jury about the arrangement between Senator Gravel and Beacon Press or
about his own participation, if any, in the alleged transaction . . . .”).
35. See generally id. (indicating that the case was decided on June 29,
1972); Brewster v. United States, 408 U.S. 501 (1972) (same).
36. See Brewster v. United States, 408 U.S. 501, 528−29 (1972) (holding
that “under these statutes and this indictment, prosecution of appellee is not
prohibited by the Speech or Debate Clause”). The Court considered which
actions by legislators qualify as immune legislative acts under the Speech or
Debate Clause. Id. at 503. Senator Brewster was charged with accepting a bribe
in return for promises regarding postage rate legislation. Id. at 502. Senator
Brewster argued that his actions were privileged under the Speech or Debate
Clause and the indictment must be dismissed. Id. at 503. The Court disagreed
with Senator Brewster. Id. at 528−29. It explained that although past cases
have defined a legislative act “as an act generally done in Congress in relation to
the business before it,” the privilege is not unlimited. Id. at 512. The Court
noted that there are a number of activities that are in some sense related to
legislative activity but are not protected under the Clause because they are not
“clearly a part of the legislative process.” Id. at 512−13, 516. The Court
emphasized that a strong link to the legislative process is necessary to prevent
legislators from avoiding criminal prosecution. Id. at 520. The Court concluded
that Senator Brewster’s actions were not privileged because accepting a bribe
was in no way “part of the legislative process or function.” Id. at 525, 528−29.
37. See id. at 515−16 (“In every case thus for [sic] before this Court, the
Speech or Debate Clause has been limited to an act which was clearly a part of
the legislative processthe due functioning of the process.”).
38. Id. at 513−14.
39. See id. at 516 (stating that if the Speech or Debate Clause was
construed to extend the legislative privilege “to include all things in any way
related to the legislative process,” there would be “few activities in which a
legislator engages that he would be unable somehow to ‘relate’ to the legislative
process”).
40. Id.
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standard to the facts, the Court determined that accepting a bribe
does not meet the legislative act standard and was therefore not
privileged.41
Although it appears that the Supreme Court has attempted
to narrow the legislative act definition,42 a number of cases have
permitted legislators’ actions to be privileged in disconcerting
circumstances.43 In Doe v. McMillan,44 school children’s parents
41. See id. at 526 (stating that “[t]aking a bribe is, obviously, no part of the
legislative process or function” and is therefore not a privileged legislative
action).
42. See id. at 515−16 (“[T]he Speech or Debate Clause has been limited to
an act which was clearly a part of the legislative process—the due functioning of
the process.”); United States v. Gravel, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972) (stating that
not every action taken by a legislator will be privileged, and to be privileged
under the Clause, an action must be essential to carrying out the individual’s
duties as a legislator); see also Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S.
491, 504 (1975) (applying the standard set forth in Gravel for determining
whether activities qualify as immune legislative acts (citing Gravel, 408 U.S. at
625)).
43. See Eastland, 421 U.S. at 507 (“We conclude that the Speech or Debate
Clause provides complete immunity for the Members for issuance of this
subpoena.”); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312−13 (1973) (“Congressmen and
their aides are immune from liability for their actions within the ‘legislative
sphere . . . .’”(quoting Gravel, 408 U.S. at 624−25)).
44. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 324 (1973) (holding that “the Court
of Appeals applied the immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause and of the
doctrine of official immunity too broadly”). The Court considered the scope of the
Speech or Debate Clause. Id. at 307. The House of Representatives directed the
Committee on the District of Columbia to carry out an investigation. Id. As part
of the investigation, the Committee collected academic information about
specific students. Id. at 308. The report was presented at Committee hearings,
given to the Speaker of the House, and voted on for publication. Id. at 312.
Additionally, the report was printed and given to members of Congress for
“legislative purposes.” Id. Parents of children who were identified in the report
brought suit for a violation of theirs “and their children’s statutory,
constitutional, and common-law rights to privacy.” Id. at 309. The Court
considered whether the investigation and use of the children’s information
should be protected by the legislative privilege. Id. at 309−11. The Court stated
that to be immune under the privilege, the actions must fall “within the
‘legislative sphere.’” Id. at 312 (citation omitted). The Court noted that actions
that qualify as legislative acts can be privileged even though in other situations
they would violate the law. Id. at 312−13. Additionally, the Court stated that it
is not the role of the Judiciary to question the necessity of congressional action
taken within the legislative sphere. Id. at 313. The Court held that the
authorization of the investigation, the actual investigation, the disclosure of the
information at the hearings, and the preparation, publication, and distribution
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sued legislators and their aides who collected information from
schools about the children.45 The parents claimed a violation of
theirs “and their children’s statutory, constitutional, and
common-law rights to privacy.”46 The Court stated that the
investigation, the presentation of the information at Committee
hearings, and the referral of the report to the Speaker of the
House were all privileged legislative acts.47 The information
remained privileged when it was “distributed to and used for
legislative purposes by Members of Congress, congressional
committees, and institutional or individual legislative
functionaries.”48 The Court indicated that acts within the
“‘legislative sphere’” are privileged even if in other situations they
would be considered unconstitutional or a violation of local law.49
The Court’s only constraint on this extremely broad
interpretation of the privilege was its statement that it did not
extend to those who, by congressional authorization, provided the
materials to the public in violation of the Constitution and other
laws.50

of the report to Committee members were privileged legislative acts. Id. at 313.
The Court also held that, despite congressional authorization, defendants who
made the information available to the public at large were not acting within the
legislative sphere. Id. at 316. Thus, their actions were not privileged. Id.
45. See id. at 309 (stating that petitioners brought suit on behalf of their
children against various members of the House Committee on the District of
Columbia).
46. Id.
47. See id. at 312 (stating the Clause protected Congressmen-Committee
members, the Committee staff, the consultant, and the investigator who
“introduce[ed] material at Committee hearings that identified particular
individuals, . . . referr[ed] the report that included the material to the Speaker
of the House, and [who] vot[ed] for publication of the report”).
48. Id.
49. See id. at 312−13 (“Congressmen and their aides are immune from
liability for their actions within the ‘legislative sphere’ even though their
conduct, if performed in other than legislative contexts, would in itself be
unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to criminal or civil statutes.” (citation
omitted)).
50. See id. at 316 (stating that defendants who provided the information to
the public, pursuant to congressional authorization, were not protected by the
privilege).
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Similarly, in Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund,51
the Court determined that a senator’s questionable actions fell
within the scope of the privilege, despite the attempted
narrowing of the legislative act definition.52 In this case, Senator
Eastland signed a subpoena in his role as chairman of a Senate
subcommittee.53 The organization affected by the subpoena
claimed it violated its constitutional rights and sought an
injunction that would prevent its enforcement.54
The Court applied the test created in Gravel.55 It determined
that investigation and inquiry qualify as legislative acts because
they are “an integral part of the legislative process.”56 The Court
emphasized that the investigation was protected by the privilege

51. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 507 (1975) (“We
conclude that the Speech or Debate Clause provides complete immunity for the
Members for issuance of this subpoena.”). The Court considered whether a
subpoena issued by Senator Eastland, in his role as chairman of a Senate
subcommittee, fell within the “‘sphere of legitimate legislative activity’”
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. Id. at 494, 501. In 1970, the Senate
authorized the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security to conduct an
investigation of the Internal Security Act of 1950. Id. at 493. Acting under this
authority, the Subcommittee initiated an investigation of the United States
Servicemen’s Fund, Inc. (USSF). Id. While carrying out the examination,
Senator Eastland signed a subpoena duces tecum, which was issued to USSF’s
bank. Id. at 494. Consequently, USSF brought an action seeking an injunction
that would prevent the enforcement of the subpoena. Id. at 496. USSF claimed
that the subpoena was aimed as silencing the organization in violation of the
First Amendment. Id. at 495. In determining whether the act of issuing the
subpoena should be privileged, the Court reaffirmed the test for legislative
action set forth in prior cases. Id. at 501−04. The Court then determined that
subpoenas have “long been held to be a legitimate use by Congress of its power
to investigate.” Id. at 504 (citation omitted). Thus, the Court concluded that the
legislative privilege protected the legislators who authorized the subpoena. Id.
at 507.
52. See id. at 507 (“We conclude that the Speech or Debate Clause provides
complete immunity for the Members for issuance of this subpoena.”).
53. See id. at 494 (stating that Senator Eastland approved a subpoena
duces tecum).
54. See id. at 495−96 (stating that the United States Servicemen’s Fund,
Inc. sought an injunction claiming that the subpoena violated the First
Amendment).
55. See id. at 504 (quoting the Gravel standard for determining whether
actions qualify as immune legislative acts).
56. Id. at 504−05.
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because it was connected to a permissible function of Congress.57
In reaching this conclusion, the Court distinguished Eastland’s
facts from prior cases in which illegal actions by legislators were
not privileged.58 For example, the Court explained that in
Kilbourn, the individual who carried out an illegal arrest was not
immune because his action was not “‘essential to legislating.’”59 In
contrast, according to the Court, the Eastland subpoena was
privileged because it was made in an investigation relating to a
topic that could be the subject of lawmaking.60 This was found to
be true despite the alleged violation of the Constitution.
Finally, it is important to note that the legislative privilege
only applies to legislative actions that have been completed.61 As
explained in United States v. Helstoski,62 “[p]romises by a
57. See id. at 505−06 (“The particular investigation at issue here is related
to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress.” (citing Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957))).
58. See id. at 507−08 (explaining that respondents had pointed to language
in Gravel to argue that the subpoena should not be privileged because it violated
their right to privacy (citing Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 621 (1972))).
The Court, however, disagreed and distinguished the cases. Id. at 508.
59. Id. at 508 (citation omitted).
60. See id. (stating that the action in this case was privileged because it
was “a routine subpoena intended to gather information about a subject on
which legislation may be had” (citing Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161
(1955))).
61. See Jay Rothrock, Striking a Balance: The Speech or Debate Clause’s
Testimonial Privilege and Policing Government Corruption, 24 TOURO L. REV.
739, 752 (2008) (“[T]he Court in United States v. Helstoski held that the term
‘legislative acts’ extends only to those past acts which have already taken
place.”(citation omitted)).
62. See United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 489 (1979) (holding that
the Speech or Debate Clause protects “references to past legislative acts of a
Member” from required disclosure). The Court considered the effect of the
Speech or Debate Clause on the admissibility of legislative act evidence in a
former congressman’s criminal trial. Id. at 479. Respondent Helstoski, a former
member of the House, was on trial for allegedly receiving payment in return for
promises of legislative action, which he eventually carried out. Id. Specifically,
Helstoski accepted money and in return introduced immigration bills that were
favorable to aliens. Id. Helstoski appeared before a grand jury on numerous
occasions and eventually claimed his indictment must be dismissed under the
Speech or Debate Clause. Id. at 484. The district court did not dismiss the
indictment. Id. It did, however, state that the Speech or Debate Clause
prohibited the Government from introducing evidence of completed legislative
acts at trial. Id. The Government appealed, arguing that completed legislative
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Member to perform an act in the future are not legislative acts.”63
Thus, they are not immune under the Speech or Debate Clause.64
B. Defining “shall not be questioned in any other Place”
In determining the scope of the legislative privilege, the
Supreme Court has also interpreted the meaning of the phrase
“shall not be questioned in any other Place.”65 The Supreme
Court has determined that this language of the Speech or Debate
Clause provides legislators with testimonial66 and liability
privileges.67
The suggestion of a testimonial privilege first arose in United
States v. Johnson.68 In Johnson, the lower court concluded that
acts should be admissible in order to show the respondent’s motive for accepting
the bribe. Id. at 485. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the case law
“leave[s] no doubt that evidence of a legislative act of a Member may not be
introduced by the Government.” Id. at 487 (citations omitted). The Court
indicated that the fact that this holding may make prosecutions more difficult is
irrelevant. Id. at 488. Finally, the Court stated that promises of future
legislative acts will not be privileged under the Clause. Id. at 489.
63. Id. at 489.
64. See id. (indicating that the Clause does not protect legislators from
inquiry about legislative acts that may occur in the future).
65. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Gravel, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972) (stating that
a senator cannot “be made to answer . . . in terms of questions” about a
legislative act); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177 (1966) (“We see no
escape from the conclusion that such an intensive judicial inquiry, made in the
course of a prosecution by the Executive Branch under a general conspiracy
statute, violates the express language of the Constitution and the policies which
underlie it.”).
67. See, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502−03
(1975) (explaining that the Speech or Debate Clause provides legislators with
“protection against civil as well as criminal actions, and against actions brought
by private individuals as well as those initiated by the Executive Branch” ).
68. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 184−85 (1966) (holding that
a conviction based on a criminal statute that is obtained by questioning a
legislator about legislative action is a violation of the Speech or Debate Clause).
The Court considered whether a former congressman’s conspiracy conviction
could be overturned because of a violation of the Speech or Debate Clause. Id. at
171. The lower court found former Congressman Johnson guilty of conspiracy.
Id. Johnson had agreed to persuade the Department of Justice to dismiss
charges against a loan company in exchange for funds from the company. Id. at
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former Congressman Johnson had agreed to persuade the
Department of Justice to dismiss charges against a loan company
in exchange for funds from the company.69 Additionally, the lower
court found that Johnson had agreed to make a speech in the
House that would support the loan company.70 The Supreme
Court, however, held that Johnson’s legislative privilege had been
violated because the conviction was obtained through inquiry into
the circumstances and motives of a speech made in the House.71
Although the Court found in favor of Johnson, it made clear that
its decision is limited to the facts of the case.72 The Clause cannot
be used to prohibit a criminal conviction that is not based on
inquiry into privileged legislative action.73
The testimonial privilege initially suggested in Johnson was
specifically recognized in Gravel.74 Gravel indicated that the
171−72. Additionally, Johnson had agreed to make a speech in the House that
would support the loan company. Id. The conspiracy conviction, however, was
set aside by the court of appeals due to a claim that questioning Johnson about
his agreement to make the speech in return for payment violated the Speech or
Debate Clause. Id. at 171. The Court first explained that the Speech or Debate
Clause clearly does not cover “conduct, such as was involved in the attempt to
influence the Department of Justice, that is in no wise related to the due
functioning of the legislative process.” Id. at 172. The Court next considered the
Government’s inquiry about the speech. Id. at 173−76. The Government had
questioned Johnson about who wrote the speech, the reasons for certain
statements contained in the speech, and the motives for its delivery. Id. The
Court subsequently held that this type of questioning violated the Speech or
Debate Clause. Id. at 184−45; see also Rothrock, supra note 61, at 751 n.45
(stating that “Johnson implies the creation of the testimonial privilege”).
69. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 171−72 (explaining the charges against former
Congressman Johnson).
70. See id. (explaining the bribe accepted by Johnson).
71. See id. at 184−85 (holding that a criminal conviction based on
questioning about legislative actions violated the Speech or Debate Clause).
72. See id. at 185 (“We emphasize that our holding is limited to
prosecutions involving circumstances such as those presented in the case before
us.”).
73. See id. (“Our decision does not touch a prosecution which, though as
here founded on a criminal statute of general application, does not draw in
question the legislative acts of the defendant member of Congress or his motives
for performing them.”).
74. See Rothrock, supra note 61, at 751 n.45 (“[M]any courts cite [the
testimonial privilege’s] creation to Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615,
616 (1972), which first explicitly articulated and applied the privilege impliedly
created in Johnson.”).
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testimonial privilege permits legislators and their aides to refuse
to testify about legislative acts.75 Additionally, the testimonial
privilege can be used to immunize qualifying legislative acts from
being admitted into evidence at trial.76 This will not, however,
prevent a legislator from being convicted through questioning
about actions not protected by the Clause.77
In addition to the testimonial privilege, the Clause provides a
powerful immunity against liability.78 Thus, when a legislator is
acting within the legislative sphere,79 his actions are immune
from suit.80 The immunity against liability protects
congressmen’s legislative acts from being the subject of civil and
criminal actions.81
In Eastland, the Court cited numerous cases confirming that
the Clause provides a very broad immunity privilege.82 Eastland
explained that this expansive interpretation is necessary to
ensure that legislators can carry out their legislative tasks
without the threat of suit.83 The Court reasoned that both civil
and criminal actions “create[] a distraction and force[] Members
to divert their time, energy, and attention from their legislative
75. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972) (stating that the
Senator and his aide could not be forced to testify about the Subcommittee
meeting).
76. See Rothrock, supra note 61, at 751 (“[A] testimonial privilege may be
asserted to prevent the admission of legislative acts into evidence . . . .”).
77. See id. (“[T]he legislator can still be prosecuted based upon the
unprotected evidence.”).
78. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502−03 (1975)
(discussing the Clause’s protection against civil and criminal actions and those
brought by the Executive).
79. See supra Part II.A (defining which actions by legislators qualify as
privileged legislative acts).
80. See Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503 (“We reaffirm that once it is determined
that Members are acting within the ‘legitimate legislative sphere’ the Speech or
Debate Clause is an absolute bar to interference.” (citing Doe v. McMillan, 412
U.S. 306, 314 (1973))).
81. See id. at 502 (stating that the Clause “protect[s] against civil as well as
criminal actions”).
82. See id. at 502−03 (citing Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881),
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306
(1973), and Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967)).
83. See id. at 503 (explaining the negative implications of lawsuits on
legislators’ ability to perform their legislative duties).
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tasks to defend the litigation.”84 This unnecessary “distraction”
can impinge the legislative process.85 Additionally, the Judiciary’s
involvement threatens “legislative independence,” which the
Clause was designed to protect.86
III. The Circuit Split: The Speech or Debate Clause and Its
Application to Document Review
An issue that has not been addressed by the Supreme Court
is the Speech or Debate Clause’s application to governmental
review of a legislator’s documents in an investigation into the
legislator’s alleged misconduct.87 The resolution of this issue
depends on whether document review falls within the purview of
the phrase “shall not be questioned in any other Place.”88
Although the Supreme Court has not spoken on this issue,89 the
Ninth and D.C. Circuits have each drawn a different conclusion
regarding the breadth of the privilege, creating a split among the
circuits.90

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 659
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (indicating that the Supreme Court has not addressed the
Speech or Debate Clause’s application to document disclosure).
88. See id. at 659−60 (considering whether the testimonial privilege
“includes a non-disclosure privilege”).
89. See id. at 659 (“The Supreme Court has not spoken to the precise issue
at hand.”).
90. Compare United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“[T]he Clause does not incorporate a non-disclosure privilege as to any branch.”
(citations omitted)), with Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 663 (“[W]e hold that a search
that allows agents of the Executive to review privileged materials without the
Member’s consent violates the Clause.”).
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A. The D.C. Circuit: United States v. Rayburn House Office
Building
In United States v. Rayburn House Office Building,91 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit considered the propriety of a search of former
Congressman Jefferson’s office in light of the privilege conferred
by the Speech or Debate Clause.92 This case is significant because
the search was the first time that the Executive had ever ordered
a search of a sitting congressman’s office.93 Not surprisingly,
Jefferson challenged the search, asserting a violation of the
Speech or Debate Clause.94
91. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 663
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that “a search that allows agents of the Executive to
review privileged materials without the Member’s consent violates the Clause”).
The court considered the application of the Speech or Debate Clause to searches
performed by the Executive Branch. Id. at 655. Additionally, the court
determined the proper remedy for a violation of the Clause. Id. at 663−66. The
Department of Justice issued a search warrant for former Representative
William J. Jefferson’s office. Id. at 656. The warrant was issued in an
investigation surrounding Jefferson’s alleged involvement in a bribery scheme.
Id. It was believed that Jefferson had accepted payments from businesses and in
return promised to use his position in Congress to promote legislation
benefitting those paying him. Id. The warrant permitted FBI agents to collect
information from Jefferson’s office. Id. Then, a “filter team” reviewed the
information and was instructed to remove documents that “were not responsive
to the search warrant” or “were subject to the Speech or Debate Clause
privilege.” Id. at 656−57. The circuit court was given documents labeled
“potentially privileged” to determine if they were in fact covered by the Clause.
Id. at 657. Jefferson argued that the search violated his legislative privilege. Id.
The court pointed to Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d
408, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1995), in which it held that “the Clause includes a nondisclosure privilege” in civil suits. Id. at 660. The court reasoned that a
nondisclosure privilege applies in criminal actions as well. Id. The court
determined that the privilege was violated because the Executive had access to
privileged documents before Jefferson had the opportunity to claim that they
were protected by the Clause. Id. at 662. Finally, the court ordered that the
privileged documents be returned and prohibited those who saw them from
revealing their contents. Id. at 666.
92. See id. at 655 (considering whether the search of former representative
Jefferson’s office violated the Speech or Debate Clause).
93. See id. at 659 (“May 20–21, 2006 was the first time a sitting Member’s
congressional office has been searched by the Executive.”).
94. See id. at 657 (stating that Jefferson “argued . . . that the issuance and
execution of the search warrant violated the Speech or Debate Clause”).
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In determining that the legislative privilege was violated, the
court followed its holding in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
v. Williams.95 The D.C. District Court, in Brown, created an
extremely broad testimonial privilege in civil suits.96 Specifically,
the Brown court protected not only direct questioning about
legislative action but also documents referring to such acts.97
In following Brown, the Rayburn court explained that the
holding in Brown was rooted in a concern that document
disclosure would “distract[]” legislators.98 Rayburn warned that
without a document privilege, “the possibility of compelled
disclosure may . . . chill the exchange of views with respect to
legislative activity.”99 Based on this reasoning, the Rayburn court
concluded that discovery of legislative act documents should
similarly be prohibited in criminal suits.100 Because Jefferson was
95. See id. at 660, 663 (discussing the District Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit’s precedent on this issue and finding the legislative privilege violated);
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 423 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (“B & W’s claim at bottom, is to a right to engage in a broad scale
discovery of documents in a congressional file that comes from third parties. The
Speech or Debate Clause bars that Claim.”). The court considered whether the
Speech or Debate Clause permits congressmen to refuse to respond to subpoenas
requiring them to produce documents in a suit among third parties. Id. at 412.
The underlying suit pertained to documents stolen from an attorney’s office by a
former paralegal. Id. at 411. A House of Representatives subcommittee received
the documents at issue. Id. at 412. Subpoenas ordering copies of the stolen
documents were then issued to two congressmen on the committee that had
allegedly received them. Id. The congressmen claimed the Speech or Debate
Clause exempted them from compliance with the subpoenas. Id. The court
determined that the Clause privileges congressmen from being forced to produce
“documentary evidence” as well as being required to testify. Id. at 420. The court
reasoned that such a privilege is vital to preventing congressional “distractions”
that “‘divert [legislators’] time, energy, and attention from their legislative
tasks.’” Id. at 421 (citation omitted). The court determined that the subpoena
violated the legislative privilege. Id. at 423.
96. See Brown, 62 F.3d at 420 (discussing the Speech or Debate Clause’s
application to documents).
97. See id. (stating that the Speech or Debate Clause’s testimonial privilege
applies to “[d]ocumentary evidence”).
98. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 660
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating that the Brown decision was based on the concern that
document disclosure requirements would cause legislative “distraction[]”).
99. Id. at 661.
100. See id. at 660 (stating that a nondisclosure privilege must apply in both
civil and criminal suits).
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prevented from removing privileged documents before his office
was searched, the D.C. Circuit held that his rights granted by the
Speech or Debate Clause were violated.101 The court assured that
this does not mean courts cannot review a legislator’s claim of
privilege.102 Pursuant to its holding, the court ordered that the
privileged documents be returned to Jefferson.103 The
Government, however, was permitted to retain the nonprivileged
documents.104
B. The Ninth Circuit: United States v. Renzi
The question of the Speech or Debate Clause’s application to
document disclosure was also considered in United States v.
Renzi.105 In Renzi, former Arizona Congressman Richard Renzi
101. See id. at 662 (stating that the search violated the Clause because it
“denied the Congressman any opportunity to identify and assert the privilege
with respect to legislative materials before their compelled disclosure to
Executive agents”).
102. See id. (indicating that courts can review a congressman’s assertion of
privilege).
103. See id. at 666 (“[W]e hold that the Congressman is entitled to the
return of all legislative materials . . . that are protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause seized [during the search].”).
104. See id. at 665 (“[I]t is unnecessary to order the return of non-privileged
materials as a further remedy for the violation of the Clause.”).
105. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding
that the “actions for which [Renzi was] prosecuted [lay] beyond [the] limits” of
the Speech or Debate Clause). The court considered the role of the Speech or
Debate Clause in the criminal investigation of former Arizona Congressman
Richard G. Renzi. Id. at 1016. Renzi was indicted for “public corruption charges
of extortion, mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy.” Id. at
1018. Specifically, Renzi was accused of promising legislative action that would
benefit parties who agreed to purchase a particular piece of land. Id. at 1016.
Purchase of the land would allow its owner to repay a debt owed to Renzi. Id.
Renzi contended that the land negotiations were legislative acts. Id. He argued
that his actions were immune from suit under the Speech or Debate Clause. Id.
Additionally, he contested the Government’s use of what he believed to be
legislative act evidence to obtain a grand jury indictment. Id. Renzi requested a
hearing at which the Government would have to show that it had not used
evidence that he believed was protected by the privilege. Id. He argued that all
the evidence relating to the land negotiations should have been suppressed. Id.
First, the court determined that the land negotiations were not legislative acts.
Id. at 1023. Next, the court concluded that the indictment was not “caused” by
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was indicted for promising legislative action that would benefit
parties who agreed to purchase a particular piece of land.106
Purchase of the land would allow its owner to repay a debt owed
to Renzi.107 Throughout this discussion, this incident will be
referred to as the land negotiations. Renzi first attempted to
obtain the Clause’s liability, testimonial, and evidentiary
privileges.108 In doing so, Renzi argued that his land negotiations
were legislative acts.109 The court disagreed for two reasons.110
First, the land negotiations did not qualify because they were not
completed legislative actions.111 The court refused to broaden the
meaning of legislative acts to include discussions leading up to
legislative action or promises of future legislative action.112
Second, the land negotiations were not privileged because
accepting a bribe does not have the requisite relationship to the
legislative process.113
the use of privileged legislative act evidence. Id. at 1031. Although the
prosecution conceded that privileged documents had been shown to the jury,
they were not necessary to obtain the indictment. Id. at 1031−32. Therefore, the
indictment was permitted to stand. Id. Finally, the court expressly disagreed
with the D.C. Circuit by permitting review of documentary evidence referencing
legislative acts when the underlying action is not privileged. Id. at 1036. The
court upheld the district court judgment and dismissed each of Renzi’s causes of
action. Id.
106. See id. at 1016 (explaining the basis for Renzi’s indictment).
107. See id. (explaining the basis for Renzi’s indictment).
108. See id. at 1020 (explaining that if the charged actions qualified as
legislative acts, the Government could not prosecute Renzi for them, the
Government could not force him or his aides to testify about them, and
“evidence of those acts could not be introduced to any jury, grand or petit”
(citation omitted)).
109. See id. at 1016 (“[H]e claims that the public corruption charges against
him amount to prosecution on account of his privileged ‘legislative acts’ . . . .’’).
110. See id. at 1022−27 (giving two reasons why Renzi’s action did not
qualify as a legislative act).
111. See id. at 1022 (“Completed ‘legislative acts’ are protected; promises of
future acts are not.” (citation omitted)).
112. See id. at 1023 (stating that “negotiating with and ultimately promising
private individuals [to] perform future legislative acts” is not a legislative act
(citation omitted) (emphasis removed)).
113. See id. (“‘Taking a bribe is, obviously, no part of the legislative process
or function; it is not a legislative act. It is not, by any conceivable interpretation,
an act performed as part of or even incident to the role of legislator.’” (citation
omitted)).
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Renzi also argued that the indictment must be thrown out
because the grand jury was presented with privileged evidence.114
This argument also failed.115 Despite the fact that the jury was
exposed to legislative act evidence, the jury could have made the
indictment without it.116 There was sufficient evidence regarding
the land negotiations, which were uncompleted nonprivileged
actions, for the indictment to stand.117
Finally, the court considered the issue of document
disclosure.118 Renzi sought an extremely broad privilege, like that
in Rayburn,119 which would prevent the Executive Branch from
forcing the congressman to produce documents relating to
legislative acts.120 The court, however, refused to follow the D.C.
Circuit.121 The court criticized Rayburn, stating that the D.C.
Circuit erroneously permitted the threat of “distraction alone” to
cause the privilege to attach.122 Although Renzi acknowledged
that potential distraction has a role in the inquiry, it concluded
that distraction can only trigger the privilege in cases in which
114. See id. at 1027 (considering “whether the district court erred by
declining to dismiss the indictment in its entirety for, as Renzi alleges, the
pervasive presentment of ‘legislative act’ evidence to the grand jury”).
115. See id. at 1031−32 (“We therefore have no cause to grant Renzi the
relief he seeks.”).
116. See id. at 1031 (stating that although the privileged documents “should
not have been presented, we cannot conclude that they were ‘essential elements
of proof’ that caused the jury to indict” (citations omitted)).
117. See id. (explaining that to obtain the indictment, the Government only
needed to “introduce evidence of Renzi’s promise to support legislation and the
circumstances surrounding that promise”).
118. See id. at 1032−39 (considering whether the Speech or Debate Clause
confers a document nondisclosure privilege).
119. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 660
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding that the Speech or Debate Clause provides a document
nondisclosure privilege).
120. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1033 (9th Cir. 2011)
(explaining that Renzi sought to “preclude the Executive from obtaining and
reviewing ‘legislative act’ evidence”).
121. See id. at 1034 (“[W]e cannot agree with our esteemed colleagues on the
D.C. Circuit.”).
122. See id. (“Rayburn rests on the notion that ‘distraction’ of Members and
their staffs from their legislative tasks is a principal concern of the Clause, and
that distraction alone can therefore serve as a touchstone for application of the
Clause’s testimonial privilege.” (citation omitted)).
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the action at issue is privileged.123 The court held that when
evidence is sought to prosecute nonprivileged action, here Renzi’s
illegal land negotiations, legislators can be forced to disclose
documents containing references to legislative acts.124
IV. Resolving the Split: Narrowing the Scope of the
Legislative Privilege
In order to resolve this issue, it is important to carefully
consider the text and history of the Speech or Debate Clause.125
Additionally, it is essential that one study the effect that this
very powerful privilege has on the values, such as selfgovernment, upon which the United States was founded.126
A. A Look at the Text of the Speech or Debate Clause
In both the Renzi and Rayburn opinions, the courts reference
the current scope of the Speech or Debate Clause as set forth in
Supreme Court decisions.127 A textual analysis of the Clause,
however, does not support the extremely broad reach it is given
by courts today.128
123. See id. at 1035 (stating the “concern for distraction alone precludes
inquiry only when the underling action is itself precluded”).
124. See id. at 1036 (indicating that “documentary ‘legislative act’ evidence”
can be reviewed as “part of an investigation into unprotected activity”).
125. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 7 (1982) (stating that two
methods of constitutional interpretation are the “textual argument” and the
“[h]istorical argument”).
126. See id. at 94 (“It is the character, or ethos, of the American polity that is
advanced in ethical argument as the source from which particular decisions
derive.”).
127. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1021−23 (9th Cir. 2011)
(discussing Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Speech or Debate Clause);
United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(same).
128. See BOBBITT, supra note 125, at 25−38 (discussing the “textual
argument” as a method of constitutional interpretation). In this chapter, Bobbitt
explains that the “textual argument” is based “on a sort of ongoing social
contract, whose terms are given their contemporary meanings continually
reaffirmed by the refusal of the People to amend the instrument.” Id. at 26.
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Rayburn applied Brewster’s standard for interpreting the
“speech or debate” portion of the Clause, stating that “the
Supreme Court has limited the scope to conduct that is an
integral part of ‘the due functioning of the legislative process.’”129
Renzi quoted similar language from Brewster.130 Additionally,
Renzi cited Kilbourn for the assertion that the Clause protects
more than just “‘words spoken in debate.’”131 Such
interpretations, however, impermissibly ignore the contemporary
meaning of the Clause’s actual language.132
According to Webster’s dictionary, “speech” is defined as “the
communication or expression of thoughts in spoken words.”133
“Debate” is defined as “a contention by words or arguments.”134
Each of these definitions requires words. Including legislators’
actions within the phrase “speech or debate” simply because they
have a strong connection to legislating greatly deviates from the
modern understanding of the Clause’s language.135
To resolve the issue of whether the Clause provides a
nondisclosure privilege, the phrase “they shall not be questioned
in any other Place” should also be assessed through a textual
interpretation.136 The operative word in this phrase is
Thus, a textual constitutional analysis applies the modern meanings of words in
order to interpret portions of the Constitution. Id. at 33.
129. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 659 (quoting United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S.
501, 513 (1972)) (emphasis added).
130. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1021−22.
131. Id. at 1021 (quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880)).
132. See BOBBITT, supra note 125, at 30 (stating that the textual approach to
constitutional analysis “give[s] absolute affect to the words of the Constitution”).
133. Speech Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/speech (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (emphasis added) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
134. Debate Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/debate (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (emphasis added) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
135. See, e.g., Brewster v. United States, 408 U.S. 501, 515−16 (1972)
(stating that the Clause applies to “an act which was clearly a part of the
legislative process—the due functioning of the process” (emphasis added)); see
also BOBBITT, supra note 125, at 26 (stating that the textual constitutional
analysis uses the current meanings of the words in the text).
136. See BOBBITT, supra note 125, at 25−38 (discussing the “textual
argument” as a method of constitutional interpretation).
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“questioned,” which is defined as “to ask a question of or
about.”137 The word “question” is defined as “a form of words
addressed to a person in order to elicit information or evoke a
response; interrogative sentence.”138 It has also been defined as
“an interrogative expression often used to test knowledge.”139 The
plain meaning of the word “question” suggests that an individual
be present in order to supply an answer to the questioner.140
Additionally, the word “they” in the Clause refers to congressmen
who are the subjects of the questioning.141 Thus, the explicit
language of the Clause supports a testimonial privilege, which
protects congressmen from “words addressed to [them] in order to
elicit information” about qualifying “speech or debate.”142 In
contrast, an inanimate object, such as a document, cannot be
“questioned” in such a manner. A document nondisclosure
privilege would improperly expand the legislative privilege
beyond the text’s contemporary meaning.143
B. The Legislative Privilege and the Framers’ Intent
In addition to studying the Clause’s text, its history should
be considered to determine the Clause’s application to a
document nondisclosure privilege.144 As explained by John
137. Questioned Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/questioned (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
138. Question Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/
browse/question (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
139. Question Definition, FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.
com/question (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
140. See supra notes 138−39 and accompanying text (providing definitions
for the word “question”).
141. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (showing that the word “they” in the
Speech or Debate Clause is referring to “Senators and Representatives”).
142. See id.; see also supra notes 138−39 and accompanying text (defining
the word “question”).
143. See BOBBITT, supra note 125, at 33 (stating that the textual analysis
interprets the Constitution by using modern definitions of its terms).
144. See id. at 9−24 (discussing the “historical argument” of constitutional
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Adams, the Constitution must be interpreted according to its
original meaning “‘to preserve the advantages of liberty and to
maintain a free government.’”145 The Speech or Debate Clause
should be applied today in accordance with the constitutional
Framers’ intentions.146
The “original understanding” of the Clause can be defined by
considering the circumstances of its inclusion in the American
Constitution.147 The language of the Speech or Debate Clause is
nearly identical to the parliamentary privilege granted by the
1689 English Bill of Rights.148 The Framers included the Clause
at the Constitutional Convention without extensive discussion.149
Only minor changes were made to the Clause throughout the
drafting period, and the final draft from the Committee of Detail
had almost the same language as the Speech or Debate Clause in
the Articles of Confederation.150 The Committee members
unanimously accepted this final draft.151 Similarly, the Clause
was not contested at states’ ratification debates.152 This nearly
uncontroverted adoption of the Clause can be explained by the

analysis).
145. Id. at 9 (quoting John Adams as support for the “historical argument”
of constitutional interpretation).
146. See id. at 9−10 (stating that the historical argument considers the
Framers’ intentions to determine the meaning of the Constitution).
147. See id. at 9−11 (“[T]he Supreme Court announced that construction of
the Constitution must rely on ‘the meaning and intention of the convention
which framed and proposed it for adoption and ratification.’” (citation omitted)).
148. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 659
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating that the Speech or Debate Clause very closely matches
the language of the 1689 English Bill of Rights).
149. See JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW 87 (2007) (“The
Speech or Debate Clause seems to have been little discussed at the Philadelphia
Convention.”).
150. See id. at 87−88 (explaining the minimal changes to the Clause
throughout its drafting).
151. See id. at 88 (stating that the final draft by the Committee of Detail
was “approved by the entire Convention without dissent or even recorded
debate”).
152. See id. (“[T]he Clause was completely uncontroversial at the states’
ratification debates and in the debates in the press.”).
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historical acceptance of a legislative speech or debate privilege in
American government.153
Because of the lack of debate surrounding the adoption of the
Speech or Debate Clause at the Constitutional Convention,
records from the Convention itself provide little insight into the
Framers’ understanding of the legislative privilege.154 After the
Constitution’s ratification, however, statements made by the
Framers and other individuals who were influential in early
America provide information regarding the Speech or Debate
Clause’s purpose.155
James Wilson, a constitutional Framer, discussed the Speech
or Debate Clause, stating:
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the
publick to discharge his publick trust with firmness and
success, it is indisputably necessary, that he should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from
the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the
exercise of that liberty may occasion offence.156

Additionally, Wilson commended the Clause for supporting
legislative independence.157 He said that it was “‘a very
considerable improvement in the science and the practice of

153. See id. at 87 (stating that the Articles of Confederation and three state
constitutions contained clauses providing a speech or debate privilege); see also
Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 30, at 1136 (“Presumably because the
principle was so firmly rooted, there was little discussion of the clause during
the debates of the Constitutional Convention and virtually none at all in the
ratification debates.”).
154. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 30, at 1136 (explaining that
there was minimal discussion of the Clause at the Constitutional Convention);
see also BOBBITT, supra note 125, at 9 (explaining that “[h]istorical arguments
depend on a determination of the original understanding of the constitutional
provision to be construed”).
155. See CHAFETZ, supra note 149, at 88−89 (discussing statements made
after the Constitutional Convention by the Founders about the Speech or
Debate Clause’s meaning).
156. Id. at 88 (citation omitted).
157. See Laura Krugman Ray, Discipline Through Delegation: Solving the
Problem of Congressional Housecleaning, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 389, 403 (1994)
(stating that Wilson commended the Speech or Debate Clause for “its role in
securing legislative independence”).
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government.’”158 From these statements, it is clear that the
Framers included the Clause to facilitate legislators’ ability to
carry out their role as lawmakers by shielding them from liability
for their speech.159
Thomas Jefferson wrote about the legislative privilege in a
petition to the Virginia House of Delegates.160 Although Jefferson
did not attend the Constitutional Convention or sign the
Constitution, as one of the drafters of the Declaration of
Independence and a “founding father,” his understanding of the
Speech or Debate Clause can provide useful insight into the
Framers’ intent. Jefferson made the petition in support of Samuel
Cabell, who was a member of the House of Representatives.161
Cabell had been charged with seditious libel based on a letter he
had written that spoke unfavorably of the Adams
administration.162 In the petition, Jefferson wrote:
[I]n order to give to the will of the people the influence it ought
to have, and the information which may enable them to
exercise it usefully, it was a part of the common law, adopted
as the law of this land, that their representatives, in the
discharge of their functions, should be free from the
cognizance or coercion of the coordinate branches, Judiciary
and Executive; and that their communications with their
constituents should of right, as of duty also, be free, full, and
unawed by any.163

First, the circumstances of the petition provide information on
the original understanding of the Clause.164 Jefferson discussed
158. See id. (citation omitted).
159. See supra notes 156−58 and accompanying text (providing quotations
from James Wilson, one of the Constitution’s Framers, about the Speech or
Debate Clause’s meaning and purpose).
160. See CHAFETZ, supra note 149, at 88 (discussing Jefferson’s comments on
the legislative privilege in a petition to the Virginia House of Delegates).
161. See id. (discussing Jefferson’s petition to the Virginia House of
Delegates on behalf of Samuel A. Cabell, who was a member of the House of
Representatives).
162. See id. (stating that Cabell “was charged with seditious libel for a letter
he sent to constituents denouncing the Adams administration”).
163. Id. (citation omitted).
164. See id. (discussing Jefferson’s petition to the Virginia House of
Delegates, which provides insight into his understanding of the Speech or
Debate Clause).
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the legislative privilege in a petition to aid a congressman who
had been charged because of a letter voicing his opinion.165 This
fact supports the assertion that the Clause was aimed at
preventing the other branches of government from punishing
congressmen who express unpopular views.166 Second, in this
statement, Jefferson, like Wilson, indicates that the legislative
privilege is aimed at enabling legislators to fulfill their roles as
lawmakers.167 According to Jefferson, in order for the people to
actively participate in government through their legislators, they
must be adequately informed.168 Consequently, the legislative
privilege was included to encourage legislators to provide voters
with essential information by reducing their fear that other
branches of government will punish them.169
In addition to the quoted language above, other portions of
the petition emphasized “the link between freedom of speech and
debate on the floor of the legislature, freedom of communication
with constituents, and popular sovereignty.”170 Jefferson
discussed the need for free communication between legislators
and the people in representative government.171 He asserted that
if legislators are put “‘into jeopardy of criminal prosecution, of
vexation, expense, and punishment before the Judiciary’” for
statements that “‘do not exactly square with [its] ideas of fact or
right, or with [its] designs of wrong,’” legislative independence
165. See id. (stating that Representative Cabell had been charged with
seditious libel for a letter “denouncing the Adams administration”).
166. See id. (discussing Jefferson’s petition in support of Representative
Cabell who was charged with seditious libel because of his controversial
statements about the Adams administration).
167. See supra text accompanying note 163 (quoting Jefferson’s petition to
the Virginia House of Delegates); see also supra notes 156−59 and accompanying
text (discussing Wilson’s statements about the Speech or Debate Clause).
168. See supra text accompanying note 163 (quoting Jefferson’s petition to
the Virginia House of Delegates).
169. See supra text accompanying note 163 (quoting Jefferson’s petition to
the Virginia House of Delegates).
170. CHAFETZ, supra note 149, at 89.
171. See id. (“‘[F]or the Judiciary to . . . overawe the free correspondence
which exists and ought to exist between [representatives and the people] . . . is
to put the legislative department under the feet of the Judiciary . . . .’” (citation
omitted)).
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will be impinged and representative government destroyed.172
These statements provide further support for the argument that
the Speech or Debate Clause was designed to promote
communication between legislators and their constituents by
protecting legislators from liability for such communication.173
Lastly, James Madison stated that interpretation of the
Clause must be guided by “‘the reason and necessity of the
privilege.’”174 He warned that “‘[i]t is certain that the privilege
has been abused in British precedents, and may have been in
American also.’”175 These statements by James Madison indicate
that the Clause should be interpreted only as broadly as required
to accomplish its purposes.176 Additionally, courts must be careful
when applying the Clause in order to prevent legislators from
taking advantage of the protection for personal gain.177
In addition to considering statements made by the original
interpreters of the Constitution to determine the intended
meaning of the privilege, it is also significant that the Clause’s
language was largely taken from the English Bill of Rights.178
Thus, the Framers likely intended the American Speech or
Debate Clause to have a meaning similar to the English article
from which it originated.179 Consequently, the English
parliamentary privilege can be used to understand the
interpretation the Framers envisioned when they used nearly
identical language in the American Constitution.180
172. Id. (citation omitted).
173. See supra notes 170−72 and accompanying text (discussing Thomas
Jefferson’s statements about the Speech or Debate Clause’s purpose).
174. CHAFETZ, supra note 149, at 89 (citation omitted).
175. Id. (citation omitted).
176. See supra notes 174−75 and accompanying text (providing quotes from
James Madison about the Speech or Debate Clause).
177. See supra notes 174−75 (providing guidance from James Madison for
interpreting and applying the Speech or Debate Clause).
178. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 659
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (stating that the Speech or Debate Clause very closely matches
the language of the 1689 English Bill of Rights).
179. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 202 (1880) (“[I]t may be
reasonably inferred that the framers of the Constitution meant the same thing
by the use of language borrowed from that source.”).
180. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 659 (stating that the American Speech or
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The concept of privileging parliamentary speech and debate
is deeply rooted in English history.181 The English privilege
emerged in the early fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.182 In the
beginning, its scope was limited to shielding parliamentary
speech and debate from civil suits.183 Over time, the privilege was
expanded to include protection from Executive prosecution.184
This expansion brought a period of lengthy controversy with the
Crown regarding the privilege’s reach.185 During this era,
monarchs, displeased with criticism of their policies by members
of Parliament, asserted, “[T]he privilege ended where
[monarchial] prerogatives began.”186 Conversely, members of
Parliament argued that the privilege applied to any action
related to their role in Parliament.187
The contention regarding the reach of the parliamentary
privilege was present in the case of Sir William Williams.188 Sir
William Williams, in his parliamentary role as Speaker of the
House of Commons, permitted the publication of Dangerfield’s
Narrative of the Late Popish Designs.189 He was subsequently
Debate Clause has nearly the same language as the 1689 English Bill of Rights
granting the parliamentary privilege).
181. See CHAFETZ, supra note 149, at 69 (“The privilege of Members of
Parliament to be free from questioning in any other place for their speeches in
Parliament is undoubtedly an ancient one . . . .”).
182. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 30, at 1122 (“Parliament’s
privileges originated in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries . . . .”).
183. See id. (stating that the parliamentary privilege originally only
protected members of Parliament from civil suit).
184. See id. at 1123 (“The free speech privilege evolved gradually and
painfully into a practical instrument for security against the executive, an
evolution triggered by basic changes in the functions of the legislature.”).
185. See id. at 1126 (explaining that parliamentary “intrusions into the
Crown’s prerogatives led to a century-long battle over Parliament’s freedom of
speech or debate”).
186. Id. at 1127.
187. See id. (“[T]he House declar[ed] that the privilege was absolute for any
matter touching parliamentary business.”).
188. See CHAFETZ, supra note 149, at 74 (explaining that Sir William
Williams was “hauled before the King’s Bench on a charge of seditious libel” for
an action carried out in his role as the Speaker of the House of Commons).
189. See id. (stating that Sir William Williams, while acting as the Speaker
of the House of Commons, “ordered the printing of a pamphlet (Dangerfield’s
Narrative of the Late Popish Designs) that was libelous of the Duke of York”).
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charged with seditious libel.190 He raised the defense that his
action was privileged because it was “‘done in [the] time of
parliament, and ordered to be done by the House of Commons.’”191
Despite his assertion of privilege, Sir William Williams was
convicted.192
Shortly after Sir William Williams’s conviction, Parliament
passed the 1689 English Bill of Rights in response to incidents of
monarchial aggression.193 The Bill of Rights included Article 9,
which stated, “‘[T]he freedom of speech, and debates or
proceedings in parliament, ought not to be impeached or
questioned in any court or place out of parliament.’”194 The
legislative
privilege
guarantee
was
included
for
parliamentarians, like Sir William Williams, who were punished
by the Crown for their parliamentary actions.195 Consequently,
shortly after the Bill of Rights was passed, the House of
Commons passed a resolution that pronounced the judgment
against Williams “‘an illegal Judgment, and against the Freedom
of Parliament.’”196
Although Sir William Williams was convicted, the 1689
English Bill of Rights was created to protect individuals in
similar situations.197 This fact indicates that the English
190. See id. (stating that Sir William Williams was charged with seditious
libel).
191. Id. (citation omitted).
192. See id. (stating that despite Sir William Williams’s assertion of
parliamentary privilege, “[t]he judges disagreed”).
193. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 30, at 1134 (“[S]hortly after the
indictment of Sir William Williams, James II published a Declaration of
Indulgence declaring it to be his ‘royal will and pleasure that . . . the execution
of all and all manners of penal laws in matters ecclesiastical . . . be immediately
suspended.’” (citation omitted)). This Declaration gave the “executive power to
nullify statutes passed by Parliament.” Id. In response, the 1689 English Bill of
Rights “both abolished the suspending power and guaranteed the speech or
debate privilege.” Id. at 1135.
194. CHAFETZ, supra note 149, at 74 (citation omitted).
195. See id. at 74−75 (explaining that one drafter of the English Bill of
Rights said that the Article 9 legislative privilege “‘was put in for the sake of
one . . . Sir William Williams, who was punished out of Parliament for what he
had done in Parliament’”(citation omitted)).
196. Id. at 75 (citation omitted).
197. See id. (stating that the 1689 English Bill of Rights was created for
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parliamentary privilege was aimed at shielding parliamentarians
from suits based on the content of their speech.198 Consequently,
it can be inferred that the Framers of the American Constitution
had a similar protection in mind when they adopted nearly the
exact same language in the American Speech or Debate Clause.199
In summary, the statements by James Wilson, Thomas
Jefferson, and James Madison reveal two related purposes of the
Clause.200 First, the Framers sought to protect legislative
independence by shielding legislators from speech-based
litigation.201 Second, the Framers aimed to help legislators carry
out their duty of informing the public without the fear of
punishment.202 These purposes must be interpreted with the
Clause’s roots in the English parliamentary privilege in mind.203
Rather than allowing the Clause to protect congressional action
simply because legislators happened to discuss it aloud or put it
in writing, the Clause must be understood in a much more
limited sense.204 Instead, the Clause should be interpreted in a
fashion that only protects as legislative action statements that
could become the basis of a libel suit or speech-based crime.205
people like “‘Sir William Williams, who was punished out of Parliament for
what he had done in Parliament’” (citation omitted)).
198. See id. at 74−75 (explaining that the Speaker of the House of Commons,
Sir William Williams, was convicted of seditious libel, and the parliamentary
privilege in the 1689 English Bill of Rights was created to prevent such injustice
in the future).
199. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 202 (1880) (indicating that
because the Speech or Debate Clause has nearly the same language as that of
the English Bill of Rights, the Framers likely intended a similar meaning).
200. See supra notes 156−77 and accompanying text (discussing statements
by James Wilson, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison regarding the intended
purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause).
201. See supra notes 159, 166 and accompanying text (indicating that the
Framers sought to protect legislators from suit based on the content of their
speech).
202. See supra notes 163−73 and accompanying text (providing statements
from Jefferson about the role of the Speech or Debate Clause in encouraging
communication between legislators and their constituents).
203. See supra notes 178−99 and accompanying text (discussing the
parliamentary privilege).
204. Supra notes 178–99 and accompanying text.
205. Supra notes 178–99 and accompanying text.
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The Rayburn and Renzi decisions show that the current
interpretation of the legislative privilege has deviated from the
Framers’ “original understanding” of the Clause.206 In finding a
document nondisclosure privilege, the Rayburn court stated that
“the purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause is ‘to insure that
the legislative function the Constitution allocates to Congress
may be performed independently,’ without regard to the
distractions of private civil litigation or the periods of criminal
prosecution.”207 This focus on avoiding distraction to promote
legislative independence is misplaced.208 The legislative
independence that the Framers sought to protect was grounded
in the goal of encouraging legislators to fulfill their duty of open
communication with their constituents.209 This type of legislative
independence necessitates a privilege that protects congressmen
from speech-based suits, such as libel.210 The Rayburn privilege,
in contrast, allows a legislator who has misused his position of
power to potentially use the privilege to avoid liability.211
Rayburn gives legislators an opportunity to shield from review
documents that may contain evidence of wrongdoing merely
because the documents mention a “legislative act.”212
206. See BOBBITT, supra note 125, at 9 (stating that “[h]istorical arguments
depend on a determination of the original understanding of the constitutional
provision to be construed”).
207. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 660
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
208. See id. (stating that the purpose of the privilege is to promote
legislative independence by protecting legislators from the “‘the distractions of
private civil litigation or the periods of criminal prosecution’” (citations
omitted)).
209. See supra notes 163−73 and accompanying text (providing statements
from Jefferson about the role of the Speech or Debate Clause in encouraging
communication between legislators and their constituents).
210. See supra notes 159, 166 and accompanying text (indicating that the
Framers sought to protect legislators from suit based on the content of their
speech).
211. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 662 (indicating that in an investigation into
misconduct, legislators must be given a chance to review documents for privilege
before their forced disclosure to the Executive).
212. See id. (stating that the Speech or Debate Clause requires a
congressman to be given an “opportunity to identify and assert the privilege
with respect to legislative materials before their compelled disclosure to
Executive agents”).
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Allowing legislators to refuse to disclose documents in an
investigation of their misconduct is a far broader interpretation of
the Clause than is necessary to fulfill the Framers’ goals.213 A
privilege that could allow legislators to hide documents linked to
crime goes beyond what is needed to protect congressmen from
punishment for the content of speech that may be deemed
unpopular or a misstatement of fact.214 Moreover, this
opportunity for legislators to conceal their wrongdoing is the
antithesis of the Framers’ aim of facilitating voters’ access to
information.215
Unlike the Rayburn court, the Renzi court permitted
discovery of documents containing information about legislative
acts in an investigation of nonprivileged action.216 The court,
citing Brewster, stated that the purpose of the Clause is to
“‘preserve the independence and thereby the integrity of the
legislative process’” and that “‘financial abuses by way of
bribes . . . would gravely undermine legislative integrity and
defeat the right of the public to honest representation.’”217 The
court stated that preventing investigation by the Executive and
punishment by the Judiciary in such cases is “‘unlikely to
enhance legislative independence.’”218 As already mentioned in a
quote by Madison, the Clause must be interpreted in light of its

213. See supra notes 200−05 and accompanying text (discussing the
Framers’ goals for the Speech or Debate Clause).
214. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (quoting James Madison for
the proposition that the Speech or Debate Clause should be interpreted
according to its “‘reason and necessity’” (citation omitted)); supra note 172 and
accompanying text (providing quotations by Jefferson about the intended
purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause).
215. See supra notes 163−73 and accompanying text (discussing Jefferson’s
statements indicating that the Speech or Debate Clause was created to
encourage legislators to fulfill their duty of communication with their
constituents without the fear of punishment based on their statements).
216. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011)
(indicating that the Speech or Debate Clause does not prohibit review of
“documentary ‘legislative act’ evidence” when it is done “as part of an
investigation into unprotected activity” (citation omitted)).
217. Id. (quoting Brewster v. United States, 408 U.S. 501, 524−25 (1972)).
218. Id. (quoting Brewster v. United States, 408 U.S. 501, 524−25 (1972))
(emphasis removed).
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“‘reason and necessity.’”219 The Renzi court correctly realized that
applying the Clause in a manner that would enable congressmen
to hide misconduct, such as bribery, is not necessary to fulfill the
Clause’s purposes.220 A nondisclosure privilege for documents in
an investigation into legislative transgression is not needed to
protect legitimate legislative speech or to encourage properly
motivated legislative communication with the people.221 The
Renzi court’s refusal to grant an unlimited nondisclosure
privilege indicates that it also correctly considered James
Madison’s warning about the possibility of congressional abuse of
the privilege.222
Renzi, however, in dicta, cited Eastland for its statement
that “[w]hen the Clause bars the underlying action, any
investigation and litigation serve only as wasted exercises that
unnecessarily distract Members from their legislative tasks.”223
This statement suggests that legislators can refuse to disclose
documents by simply asserting that the underlying investigation
relates to an action protected by the legislative privilege.224
Because of the expansive definition of legislative acts,225 it will
not be difficult for legislators to obtain this classification for their
actions and prevent disclosure of documents.226 Such an
219. CHAFETZ, supra note 149, at 88 (citation omitted).
220. See Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1036 (indicating that the legislative privilege
does not include document nondisclosure when the underlying action is not
privileged).
221. See supra notes 200−02 and accompanying text (giving the Framers’
intended purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause).
222. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011)
(indicating that documents containing references to legislative acts can be
reviewed when the underlying action is not privileged); see also CHAFETZ, supra
note 149, at 88 (giving James Madison’s warning that the legislative privilege
was abused in English precedent and the American privilege could similarly be
abused).
223. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1036 (citations omitted).
224. See id. (stating that when the underlying action is privileged “any
investigation and litigation” is prohibited as “[t]hey work only as tools by which
the Executive and Judiciary might harass their Legislative brother”).
225. See supra Part II.A (discussing the broad interpretation of legislative
acts).
226. See Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1036 (“When the Clause bars the underlying
action, any investigation and litigation serve only as wasted exercises that
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interpretation of the Clause extends beyond the Framers’
intended protection against speech-based suits and is the
opposite of the Framers’ aim of supporting legislative
communication with the public.227
C. The Speech or Debate Clause and the Need for
Legislative Accountability
Lastly, the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause and the
permissibility of a document nondisclosure privilege should be
considered pursuant to the “ethical argument” of constitutional
analysis.228 This type of argument resolves constitutional issues
by choosing solutions that “comport[] with the sort of people we
are and the means we have chosen to solve political and
customary constitutional problems.”229 Stated differently, this
argument “uses the character, or ethos, of the American polity. . .
as the source from which particular decisions derive.”230
It is beyond dispute that one such “ethos” or “ethical
commitment[]” of the American polity is the notion of selfgovernment.231 This is made clear in the Declaration of
Independence, which is a reliable source for determining the
values on which America was founded.232 The second paragraph
of the Declaration states “[t]hat to secure these rights,
unnecessarily distract Members from their legislative tasks.” (citations
omitted)).
227. See supra notes 200−02 and accompanying text (giving the Framers’
intended purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause).
228. See BOBBITT, supra note 125, at 93−99 (discussing the “ethical
argument” of constitutional analysis).
229. Id. at 95.
230. Id. at 94.
231. See Phillip Bobbitt, Constitutional Law and Interpretation, in A
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 126, 135 (Dennis
Patterson ed., 1996) (“A corollary to this idea is reflected in the ethos of selfgovernment and representative institutions.”).
232. See id. (“The proto-constitutional document, the Declaration of
Independence, manifests these ethical commitments.”); see also James R.
Stoner, Jr., Is There a Political Philosophy in the Declaration of Independence?,
INTERCOLLEGIATE REV. 3, 8 (2005) (stating that the Declaration of Independence
“assert[s] a right to self-government”).
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Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed.”233 In the very next
sentence, the Declaration indicates that the people have the
power to destroy the government if it fails to protect their
rights.234 These statements clearly indicate a commitment to selfgovernment.235
Additionally, the portion of the Declaration enumerating the
wrongs of the English King shows the importance of selfgovernment.236 For example, the Declaration admonished the
King because he “refused to pass other Laws for the
accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people
would relinquish the right of Representation in the Legislature.”237
The Declaration then compares this refusal by the King to an act
of a tyrant.238 The Declaration also indicates that the King
“dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly” and he “called
together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and
distant from the depository of their Public Records, for the sole
purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures.”239
By taking away the people’s representation, the King obliterated
self-government.240 Because the Declaration of Independence
gives the King’s infringement on the Colonies’ self-government as
a basis for the American Revolution, it is clear that the concept of
self-government is an extremely important “ethos[] of the

233. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis
added).
234. Id. (giving the people the right to destroy a government that is not
serving their interests).
235. See Stoner, supra note 232, at 8−9 (indicating that the Declaration of
Independence stands for individuals’ right to self-government); cf. THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (explaining the rights of
Man and the role of government in enforcing those rights).
236. Cf. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 3−28 (U.S. 1776)
(enumerating the wrongs of the English King).
237. Id. para. 5 (emphasis added).
238. See id. (comparing the King’s action to that of a tyrant).
239. Id. paras. 6−7.
240. Cf. id. paras. 3−28 (discussing the King’s infringement on Colonial
America’s self-government).
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American polity.”241 Thus, it must be considered when making
constitutional determinations.242
Today, American self-government is achieved through a
representative system in which the people elect legislators who
will promote their interests. The integrity of the legislature is
essential to sustaining legitimate self-government.243 It is,
therefore, imperative that legislators be held accountable for
misconduct.244 Because the Speech or Debate Clause provides
legislators with a privilege that could potentially be used to hide
legislative transgressions, it must be interpreted in a manner
that eliminates, or at least reduces, the chances of such a
result.245
By holding that, pursuant to the Speech or Debate Clause,
legislators must be permitted to “assert the privilege prior to
disclosure of privileged materials to the Executive,” Rayburn’s
interpretation fails to adequately account for the need for
legislative accountability in a system of self-government.246 This
holding gives the legislator who is accused of wrongdoing vast
amounts of control over which documents the government is able
to obtain.247 Even though the court states that the legislators’
assertions of privilege can be reviewed by the courts,248 savvy
legislators will be able to avoid disclosure of potentially
241. See BOBBITT, supra note 125, at 94.
242. See id. at 93−99 (discussing the “ethical argument” of constitutional
analysis).
243. See Ray, supra note 157, at 428 (stating the very important interest of
“constituents in a fair and honest legislature”).
244. See id. (explaining that because “voters alone cannot purge their
Congress of its malefactors,” legislative accountability must be obtained through
other avenues).
245. See id. at 389 (explaining that the Speech or Debate Clause “provide[s]
sweeping protection for members of Congress from investigation by the other
branches of government”).
246. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 663 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
247. See Rothrock, supra note 61, at 759 (“By placing the initial, potentially
unlimited control of Speech or Debate Clause privilege in the hands of the
legislator being investigated, the Rayburn Court radically changed the
distribution of the most essential investigatory element—information.”).
248. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 662 (stating that Jefferson did not argue “that
his assertions of privilege could not be judicially reviewed”).
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incriminating documents by simply inserting references to
legislative material protected by the privilege.249 Rayburn’s
extension of the phrase “shall not be questioned” will make
investigations into the misconduct of legislators much more
difficult.250 This will enhance corrupt legislators’ ability to escape
liability for their betrayal of the public trust. If legislators are
permitted to use their position in government for personal gain
without reproach, they are no longer working toward the
interests of their constituents. Like when the King interfered
with representative government in Colonial America, selfgovernment will be impinged if legislators are no longer working
toward the goals of the people they have been chosen to
represent.251
Unlike Rayburn, the Renzi decision does not provide a
document nondisclosure privilege when the underlying action is
not privileged.252 The court, however, suggested that legislators
cannot be forced to disclose documents when the underlying
action is a privileged act.253 This interpretation is much narrower
than the Rayburn holding.254 Yet it still provides an avenue for
legislators to avoid accountability for impermissible actions.
Because of the broad understanding of what qualifies as a
protected legislative act, legislators can refuse to disclose
documents revealing unacceptable practices if the underlying

249. See id. (stating that legislators must be given an “opportunity to
identify and assert the privilege with respect to legislative materials before their
compelled disclosure to Executive agents”).
250. See Rothrock, supra note 61, at 759 (indicating that a document
nondisclosure privilege gives legislators control over which information the
government can obtain in an investigation).
251. See supra notes 236−42 and accompanying text (discussing the King’s
wrongdoing as set forth in the Declaration of Independence).
252. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011)
(indicating that “documentary ‘legislative act’ evidence” can be reviewed as “part
of an investigation into unprotected activity” (citation omitted)).
253. See id. (stating that “[w]hen the Clause bars the underlying action, any
investigation and litigation serve only as wasted exercises that unnecessarily
distract Members from their Legislative tasks” (citations omitted)).
254. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 663
(D.C. Cir. 2007). (holding “that a search that allows agents of the Executive to
review privileged materials without the Member’s consent violates the Clause”).
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action is sufficiently linked to a permissible legislative
function.255
There are a number of disturbing Supreme Court cases
wherein questionable legislative conduct was privileged because
it qualified as a legislative act.256 For example, in Doe v.
McMillan, the Committee on the District of Columbia compiled a
report containing “copies of absence sheets, lists of absentees,
copies of test papers, and documents relating to disciplinary
problems of certain specifically named students.”257 The children’s
parents brought suit for a violation of their “children’s statutory,
constitutional and common-law rights to privacy.”258 The court
found liability immunity for the legislators because “their actions
[were] within the ‘legislative sphere.’”259 This finding was based
on the argument that such an investigation is an “‘integral part of
the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members
participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to
the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed
legislation.’”260 Thus, the Court prohibited investigation into a
potential violation of the Constitution and criminal and civil
statutes simply because the conduct could be classified as a
legislative act.261
Similarly, in Eastland, questionable congressional conduct
could not be investigated because it was found to be within “the
255. See Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1036 (indicating that when the underlying action
is privileged, legislative act documents cannot be reviewed by the Executive).
256. See e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 495, 507
(1975) (finding that a subpoena alleged to violate complainants’ First
Amendment rights was privileged by the Speech or Debate Clause); Doe v.
McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 309, 312−13 (1973) (finding an investigation alleged to
have violated the complainants’ “statutory, constitutional, and common-law
rights to privacy” was privileged because it was “within the ‘legislative sphere’”
(citation omitted)).
257. Doe, 412 U.S. at 308.
258. Id. at 309.
259. Id. at 312 (citation omitted).
260. Id. at 313 (citation omitted).
261. See id. at 312−13 (stating that “acts within the ‘legislative sphere’” are
privileged “even though [the] conduct, if performed in other than legislative
contexts would in itself be unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to criminal or
civil statutes” (citation omitted)).
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‘legitimate legislative sphere.’”262 In Eastland, a subpoena was
issued to a bank that demanded the bank produce “‘any and all
records appertaining to or involving the account or accounts of
[United States Servicemen’s Fund].’”263 United States
Servicemen’s Fund (USSF) brought suit, stating that the
subpoena was issued for an improper purpose.264 USSF also
claimed the subpoena violated its members’ First Amendment
rights.265 The Court, however, found that the issuers of the
subpoena were protected by the privilege because it was issued
according to an “authorized investigation” and was “in
furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress.”266 Consequently,
like in Doe, an alleged violation of the Constitution by
congressmen could not be examined because it was labeled a
legislative act.267
Permitting legislative immunity and document nondisclosure
in circumstances such as those in Doe and Eastland diminishes
legislative accountability in two ways.268 First, the immunity
privilege prevents civil and criminal suits for legislative
wrongdoing.
Second,
document
nondisclosure
limits
investigations into wrongful legislative conduct, which restricts
voters’ access to such information. Each of these consequences
impair the legitimacy of self-government by allowing legislators
to commit actions that are contrary to the interests of the people
they represent.

262. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503, 507 (1975)
(citation omitted).
263. Id. at 494.
264. See id. at 495 (stating that the complainants argued that the subpoena
was issued for an improper purpose).
265. See id. at 492−93 (“We granted certiorari to decide whether a federal
court may enjoin the issuance by Congress of a subpoena duces tecum that
directs a bank to produce the bank records of an organization which claims a
First Amendment privilege status . . . .”).
266. Id. at 505−06 (citation omitted).
267. See id. at 507 (“We conclude that the Speech or Debate Clause provides
complete immunity for the Members for issuance of this subpoena.”).
268. See generally Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975)
(privileging questionable congressional conduct under the Speech or Debate
Clause); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (same).
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V. Proposed Solution: Limiting the Speech or Debate Clause and
Increasing Legislative Accountability
To narrow the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause so that it
more closely reflects its text, the intent of the Framers, and the
ethos of self-government, this Note proposes a two-part solution.
First, the issue of whether “shall not be questioned” includes a
nondisclosure privilege must be resolved. Second, the legislative
acts that are protected under the phrase “Speech or Debate” must
be narrowed.
A. Document Nondisclosure and the Scope of the Phrase “shall not
be questioned in any other Place”
This Note proposes that the Renzi holding regarding
document disclosure be adopted.269 Specifically, when the basis of
the suit is not protected by the privilege, then the Clause should
not permit document nondisclosure.270
First, this will bring the Speech or Debate Clause more in
line with the actual meaning of the words used in the text.271 As
discussed in Part IV.A, the contemporary meaning of the word
“question” requires that it be directed at an individual.272 This
definition forecloses the application of the Clause to documents.273
This test will greatly reduce legislative document nondisclosure
and the privilege will more closely conform to the Clause’s actual
language.274

269. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011)
(providing the case’s holding).
270. See id. (stating that “documentary ‘legislative act’ evidence” can be
reviewed “as part of an investigation into unprotected activity” (citation
omitted)).
271. See supra Part IV.A (interpreting the Speech or Debate Clause using a
textual approach to constitutional interpretation).
272. See supra notes 138−39 and accompanying text (providing definitions of
the word “question”).
273. See supra notes 136−43 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning
of the word “question”).
274. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the Speech or Debate Clause’s text).

LIMITING THE LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE

2167

Second, this standard adequately protects the ethos of selfgovernment.275 By reducing legislators’ ability to hide documents
containing
information
about
misconduct,
legislative
accountability will be bolstered. This standard should increase
criminal and civil prosecution for wrongdoing and improve voters’
access to information about corrupt legislators. As a result, the
integrity of the legislature will be improved and self-government
through representatives acting in good faith can be achieved.
B. Narrowing the Meaning of Legislative Acts
To obtain the protection of the privilege, a legislator’s action
must be within the meaning of the phrase “Speech or Debate.”276
The Supreme Court has indicated that qualifying legislative acts
will be privileged.277 This Note proposes a new test for the
meaning of legislative acts that will greatly reduce the number of
privileged activities. In order to be classified as “speech or
debate,” legislative action should be conduct that could be the
cause of a speech-based suit, such as libel. For example, under
this test protected action would include legislators’ statements of
opinion, policy, or belief that could later become the basis of a
libel suit. If an action does not meet this test, it should not
receive the benefit of the Speech or Debate privilege.
First, such a test adheres to the plain meaning of the words
“speech” and “debate” in the Clause.278 Second, this complies with
the intended meaning of the Clause as set forth by the
Framers.279 The Framers included the Clause to promote
legislators’ communication with their constituents and to protect
legislators from punishment for their statements, views, and
275. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the ethos of self-government).
276. See supra Part II.A (discussing actions that are protected by the phrase
“Speech or Debate”).
277. See supra Part II.A (discussing actions that are protected by the phrase
“Speech or Debate”).
278. See supra Part IV.A (interpreting the Speech or Debate Clause through
a textual analysis of constitutional interpretation).
279. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the Framers’ understanding of the
Speech or Debate Clause).
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opinions that could later be alleged untrue, libelous, or contrary
to the law in some other way.280 This test accurately reflects these
aims of the Framers.281
Finally, the test will promote the interest in self-government,
which requires that representatives be held accountable for
wrongdoing.282 By requiring conduct to be linked to a threat of
speech-based punishment, the circumstances in which legislators
will be able to avoid document nondisclosure, based on a
privileged underlying action, will be greatly reduced. This will
help prevent the troubling results in cases such as Doe and
Eastland.283 For example, in Doe the investigation and report of
children’s school records, which potentially violated the
complainants’ right to privacy, would not have qualified as a
legislative act.284 Such an investigation could not lead to a speechbased suit. Similarly, the Eastland subpoena would not have
qualified as a privileged legislative act under the proposed
standard.285 Reducing the types of legislative acts protected by
the privilege will thereby increase legislative accountability and
improve the legitimacy of self-government.
VI. Conclusion
In Rayburn, Congressman William J. Jefferson was charged
with using his position as a legislator for personal gain through
the acceptance of bribes.286 In spite of his alleged abuse of power,
he was permitted to have documents returned to him because of a
280. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the reasons the Framers included the
Speech or Debate Clause).
281. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the aims of the Framers when they
included the Speech or Debate Clause).
282. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the ethos of self-government).
283. See supra notes 256−68 and accompanying text (discussing Doe and
Eastland).
284. See supra notes 256−61 and accompanying text (discussing the
disturbing result in Doe).
285. See supra notes 262−67 and accompanying text (discussing the
disturbing result in Eastland).
286. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 656
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (discussing Jefferson’s involvement in a bribery scheme).
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legislative privilege violation.287 Thus, the D.C. Circuit created a
privilege that facilitates legislators’ ability to escape civil and
criminal liability.288 Renzi attempted to eliminate this
counterintuitive result by stating that when an investigation
relates to nonprivileged action, forced document disclosure is
permissible.289 Its decision, however, does not go far enough to
prevent legislators’ use of the privilege to hide questionable
conduct.290 By leaving the possibility of document nondisclosure
in cases where the underlying action is privileged, Renzi failed to
remove a powerful tool that corrupt legislators can use to avoid
liability.291 Because of the overly expansive definition of
legislative acts, dishonest legislators will have little trouble
linking an action that could become the subject of investigation to
a permissible legislative function.292 This will prevent
punishment of legislative wrongdoing and leave the voters
uninformed.
The proposal set forth in this Note should be adopted to help
combat legislative malfeasance.293 By limiting the privilege to
action that could be the cause of a speech-based suit, the quantity
of privileged legislative action will be reduced.294 Additionally, a
privilege that does not include document disclosure in misconduct
investigations will enhance legislative accountability.295 This will
287. See id. at 666 (holding “that the Congressman is entitled to the return
of all legislative materials . . . that are protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause”).
288. See id. at 663 (holding that the legislative privilege includes document
nondisclosure).
289. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011)
(permitting document nondisclosure when the underlying action is not
privileged).
290. See id. (permitting document nondisclosure when the underlying action
is not privileged).
291. See id. (indicating that when the underlying action is privileged,
legislative act documents cannot be reviewed by the Executive).
292. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the disturbing results in Doe and
Eastland because of the overly broad legislative act definition).
293. See supra Part V (proposing a new method of applying the Speech or
Debate Clause).
294. See supra Part V (discussing a new method of interpreting the Speech
or Debate Clause).
295. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the need for legislative accountability).
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increase the integrity of representative government and fulfill the
ethos of self-government upon which the United States was
founded.296

296.

See supra Part IV.C (discussing the ethos of self-government).

